The dialectic of media and democracy A comparative overview of traditional methods Egypt, Tunisia and Libya based on the facts of 2011 and beyond
A journalist and researcher from Egypt who practiced the profession of journalism for nearly forty years, interested in freedom of press, worked as a reporter for “Al-Ahram” in Tunisia between November 2016 and August 2018 and has books discussing its experience in transition to democracy, author of “Freedom on the Margins: in criticism of the Egyptian press conditions “issued from Cairo in two editions in 2005 and 2011 and” rebellion in the barracks: the Egyptian press and the revolution of January 25 Revolution ” Cairo 2012 and” Tunisian media after the revolution: A vision of a reporter from Egypt about journalistic sources ” Tunisia 2019 and “A Syndicate Under Siege: Another History for Egyptian Journalists ” Under Publication, and “Case A : How We Restored a Democratic Guarantee for Journalists’ syndicate Elections, The case and its documents ” jointly with Ahmed Ragheb, the lawyer, Cairo 2007,” Freedom of e Press Demonstrations 1909: a commemorative book of documentation ” Cairo 2009, in cooperation with Khaled Al- Sarjani and Hoda Nasrallah , one of the founders of the” Journalists for Change “ group in Egypt 2005 and its first general coordinator .
The relationship and the interrelationship between free and professional media on the one hand and the opportunities for building a democratic society based on respect for human rights and promoting it on the other hand were necessary. While it has become a am established fact of thought and practice, it remains under urgent and renewed review with global and regional developments. This insistence and renewal is evidenced by the fact that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is raising this relationship on its agenda and activities, as the dangers of “populism” rise and the controversy over the possibilities of using the Internet and the possibilities of the digital revolution rise. By the 2019 World Press Freedom Day, they launched their campaign, Media for Democracy: The Press and elections in a time of Media deception.
At a glance at UNESCO’s speech on this occasion, I looked at the problems and risks of directing voters to vote for reasons of anger and fear, i.e. by stirring emotions instead of the right to know, to reason and to criticism to evaluate candidates’ programs, speeches and political behavior. The UNESCO speech here also presents the latest developments in seeking to undermine the role of the media in building democracy by reaching voters directly through social media, discrediting the professional press and profligate the term “false news”. These are, of course, new developments or a “round-the-clock” language move that strikes in long-standing democracies well-established in Europe and the United States, and not only in the south and our Arab world, where freedoms, democracy, rights and professionalism are struggling to settle. Therefore, it was not surprising that the invitation to a world conference held by UNESCO at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa between 1 and 3 May 2019 included expressions calling for “informing citizens that disinformation and discrediting the press represent a danger to democracy”. “The media must make public opinion aware of its continuing democratic role and gain respect for this role and confidence,” he said, stressing that “a free, independent and professional press – both online and offline – plays a key role in democratic systems and provides information that allows citizens to make informed decisions both inside and outside voting offices.”
This global attention, as UNESCO’s preoccupation shows, goes beyond being an appropriate act or a moment of awakening. The International Organization itself issued an additional and detailed report in 2017, which monitored the ongoing conflict around the world between the establishment of media freedom, access to knowledge and the spread of information, and the dangers of “political populism” to this freedom and right. In addition to the negative effects of increasing censorship on the Internet and withholding information under the pretext of “protecting national security” and “the effects of the proliferation of “televised news” on election competitions, and the retreat of public confidence in the media, targeting journalists and impunity for perpetrators. In this context, it is clear that our Arab world is at the forefront of the regions that witnessed a noticeable rise in killing journalists because of practicing the profession. The UNESCO report recorded 191 victims in the Arab world out of 530 worldwide between 2012 and 2016.
Journalists were killed because of the practice of the profession between 2012 and 2016
For a journalist’s experience and human rights and democracy advocate coming from Cairo, I note that Egypt’s rights movement, whose most important organizations were born around the mid-1980’s, has also been fragmented, from the very beginning, into what might be called here the “interactive link” between a free and professional press and democratic state-building. Both remain Egypt Our whole Arab world is missing and searching for it in a turbulent atmosphere. He is even longing for him and dream of him. On the search journey for this paper, I found in my Archive three models that reflect the concerns with this link. These are examples only. And be careful, I do not forewarning any race or leadership, even in the Egyptian human rights context.
The first is about press freedom and human rights, where the late Dr. “Mohamed Sayed said” wrote in the middle of the 1990s, optimistic about negotiation with the state authority over a new press law. He wondered in a 37-page introduction to the book: “Do we hope that spring will pass on us in Cairo from the gate of freedom of the press?” and he hoped at the moment of a favorable meeting between political authority and intellectuals and the Press Syndicate. As freedom of the press is a necessary and certain condition for the Egyptian patriotism and for a great rise of Egyptian and Arab culture, as was the case of Cairo in its Arab surroundings at the end of the 19th century. The writer, the human rights thinker, may think that the “Egyptian state” has an awareness and interest in restoring the resources of “soft power” to gain a privileged position in its region. The second model came before the end of 1990s also from one of the pillars of the Egyptian and Arab human rights movement “Muhsin Awad”, when he called in turn for areas that agree between the government and opposition regarding education on human rights culture and linking these rights with development. This came after discussing what he considered as a “decisive influence” that the mass media play on the human rights path, whether in establishing public awareness of these rights, devolution of their concepts or through the supervisory role and ability to provide information to the public opinion and follow up the violations cases. The third model is among the long narrative of human rights literature on media freedom and elections that Egypt knew even before the January 25, 2011 revolution. Here, the book/model before us, in the absence of fair, transparent and free public election conditions, makes Muataz Al-Fujairi, a younger generation of the Egyptian human rights movement from Sa’id and Awad, proud to seek to enrich the role of the media for the integrity, competitiveness and transparency of the electoral process. The transfer of internationally recognized accumulated experience, standards and ethics and the affirmation of voters’ right to know and candidates’ right to equal media opportunities.
Of course, the tasks of the media in building a democratic society are beyond the process and the events of the elections. It goes beyond the continuing professional news functions of society in general and the processes of democratic development in particular and the opening of multi-opinion and substantive dialog on all aspects of the conflict for democracy, freedoms and citizenship, its issues, its borders and battles. They also call for public participation, not to mention a rational and critical culture. This paper takes an interactive approach to the link between free and professional media and democracy-building, compared to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and a traditional media coverage from the 2011 press, radio and television, assuming that the media, the process, and the democratic environment in general influence and affect each other. In addition to returning to sources and references, the paper calls on the direct experiences of its author as a work journalist and lived in Egypt and Tunisia, and seeks to complete the lack of direct access to Libyan society by interviews on his media reality and current press.
To establish a comparative overview, in the absence of a research heritage that seems to take this perspective on three societies whose current paths and experiences in transition to democracy after uprisings and revolutions in a society in which transitions to complex conflicts continue to progress, relapsed, and go up and down (Tunisia), another in which demand for democracy disappeared or nearly divided, the absence and collapse of the central state authority (Libya), and a third in the reproduction of power, autocracy, individual rule, and human rights violations in the name of restoring “the prestige of the state” (Egypt). It would be useful to recall the models of Egypt’s pre-2011 human-rights discourse to recall this aspiration for reform from within pre-uprisings and revolutions. The uprisings and revolutions have, of course, served to make these systems unable to reform and meet the demand for change, and have triggered a wave of demands and expectations, then, for more radical changes.
Between reporters without borders and Arab Journalists Union
The paths of conflict over transition to democracy have varied after the so-called “Arab Spring revolutions” in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the three communities that toppled dictators in 2011. Today, nearly eight years later, Tunisia continues to build a democratic but difficult country, while Egypt has fallen into a harsher authoritarian grip and reproduces what was before its revolution, while Libya suffers civil war and chaos with foreign intervention and state collapse. Tracking the shifts of reporters without borders Index in 2010, 2011/2012, and 2019 give a simplified picture of media conditions and changes in the three communities over this period of time. In 2010, on the threshold of direct uprisings or revolutions, Egypt ranked 127 out of 178 advanced countries in press freedoms and relatively on Libya (160), while Tunisia was behind the three countries to 164. Immediately after the revolution, Tunisia’s ranking jumped on the index of 11/2012 to exceed thirty countries, ranking 134th, and surpassing Libya, which improved its ranking to 155th, while Egypt’s ranking deteriorated to 166th out of 179th countries and the last among the three countries. This deterioration and decline do not reflect in my estimation and experience by using the standards of the Egyptian and state-owned press, the relative improvement in the margin of freedom and professionalism in light of the changes in the general political climate and the holding of the first free multi-presidential elections in Egypt’s history in June 2012.
“Reporters without borders”, published on May 3, 2019, reports that Egypt remains among the 19 worst “black list” countries, ranking 163 out of 180 countries, preceded by 42 out of 55 African Union member states and 15 out of 22 Arab League member states. Libya also settled among the “black list” countries and 162 directly in front of Egypt. But this year’s good news comes also from Tunisia, where it jumped 25 places from the year before 2018 and ranks 72nd. This is how the transformation of this international classification is followed by a remarkable turnaround in the comparative ranking of the three countries. The worst before the uprisings and revolutions (Tunisia) became the best. Indeed, Tunisia has gone far in the indicators of improvement and ahead 92 places among the world’s countries, while the relatively better (Egypt) have deteriorated 26. Libya ended about eight years after its revolution to maintain stability among the worst in the world, with two salaries behind.
Unlike this manual/international report, which adopts several globally adopted factors to measure the development of press freedom, the annual freedom report of the Arab Journalists Union gives researchers a chance to learn how the trade union organizations spoke to journalists in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya about the press in their respective countries. “We are talking about Switzerland or Scandinavia,” said the late press writer Salahuddin Hafiz, the Union’s Secretary-general, when the first version of this report was released in 2006. The owner of this paper has written by critics of the union, which is mostly controlled by whom he can describe as “the journalists of the regimes.” But for the last time, let’s see how it has evolved with the three countries.
| egypt | Libya | tunisia | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
2009/2010 report ( 178 countries) |
Rank 127 |
Rank 160 |
Rank 164 |
|
2011/2012 report ( 179 countries) |
Rank 166 |
Rank 155 |
Rank 134 |
|
2019 report ( 180 countries) |
Rank 160 |
Rank 162 |
Rank 72 |
For Libya, in its 2009/2010 report, the Secretary-General of its Journalists’ Association, Ashour Mohamed Al-Tlissi, wrote only a quarter of a page under the title: “The stability of the press situation”, hailing what he called “the revival of freedom of opinion and dialog”, denying any restrictions, and singled out reporters without the attack without making the effort to respond to a specific violation. He said here a text: “As for the response to what is written here and there, especially the issue of reporters without borders, we inform you that this organization has experienced how it is taking the news directed to developing countries in particular, and we have reached a complete conviction that it represents only itself and the news that it produces is not accurate in its entirety. But the Association itself returned in the following report, and a year later, to lie completely with the previous one. It recognized that “the established system was not concerned with a real reform of an information situation that was accumulated and failed and did not meet the minimum professional standards”. “We are not going to be able to have a good deal of time,” he said, according to the statement. But this optimism and enthusiasm at the dawn of freedom and professionalism in Libya quickly turned into a dark picture with the return to international reports and the reference to “the decline of press freedoms due to instability, strife and fighting”. Libya’s total absence from the Arab Journalists Union’s freedom reports over the following years ends up in the 2018/2019 report, which also translates what happened to the union organization of Libyan journalists.
If we follow the EU’s reports on 2009, 2010/2011, and 2018/2019 on Egypt and Tunisia, we can conclude that the National Union of Tunisian Journalists has undergone deeper changes than its Egyptian counterpart, reflecting relatively more important developments in the direction of progress toward press freedom. While the Egyptian trade union’s concern became a cold, tasteless and smelly recording of some cases of its trapped journalists and their trial on the charge of “joining a banned group. The report said that the government has not yet decided to release false news “in a way that does not fully reflect the public image of the deterioration of press freedom in Egypt, and does not refer to the enemies of press freedom and journalists’ prisons, the Tunisian Union has developed expertise to monitor the violations to which journalists are subjected according to international professional safety standards. This is after the Tunisian trade unionists recorded their move from coverage and collusion on the misery of the press under the old regime to open the way for freedom of the press and the associated signs of its collapse, not to mention restoring the independence of the union itself and the efforts to go ahead in this way.
Media features and setbacks on the road to democracy
Infact, The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, combined with the demand for democracy to the media in the three societies, have raised expectations of rapid, radical changes resulting in the freedom and professionalism of this media, thus facilitating the transition to democracy in general. This optimism reflects a document issued by UNESCO in summer 2011 regarding Egypt, the biggest three countries in the population, and in the state’s authority to have a greater share of the press, radio and television industry with the history of its radiation in its Arab regional environment. With reference to the need for the media in Egypt to develop and reform immediately, the introduction to the document, which was based on personal interviews with actors and media interactors in Cairo, said: “It seems clear that important changes are taking place in a consistent manner to ensure that the wrong untrue practices are prevented at least in the picture and the body we have seen before.”
The difficulties, obstacles and setbacks of reform and change, including Tunisia’s better-off state, were not immediately apparent in Cairo. At least within the largest Egyptian media institutions and by the summer of 2011 itself. The author of this paper sought to document what happened in Al-Ahram and how reform and change efforts quickly ended in failure. Thus, in a way that leads to the conclusion: “as journalists, we failed to change from within with our own forces when conditions in Egyptian society were more favorable in the immediate aftermath of January 25.” In this way, one of the dialectic aspects of information, democracy and tangible is drawn. Reform and change claimants were not able to push for written liberalization policies that adopted professional rules and ethics, nor to form responsible editorial boards, nor even to apologize to readers for what it was. Thus, it allowed the reproduction of pre-revolutionary days. And even worse.
- List of journalists and media workers in Egyptian prisons, Arab Network for Human Rights Information
- To see how limited the efforts of the transitional authorities after the overthrow of Qaddafi can be revised: Fatima al-Issawi, the Libyan Transitional Administrator , was finally released ?, Caringi Middle East Center , 14 May 2013
By 2015, the evolution of the cult of the individual ruler of the, images, and news pages of the Egyptian daily newspapers could be monitored, drawing on samples from them since 2010, drawing out the relative retreat of this phenomenon in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, and then returning to growth, as the El Sisi’s arrival at the presidency in June 2014. Perhaps there is a need for additional observation about Egypt and also through cohabitation. Until the first half of 2014, it was possible to reflect with astonishment as we salute the young men we called “the Jerbandi journalists”, who risk being injured, arrested and even killed in order to cover the events in the field. As the author of this paper returns to the end of the summer of 2018 from a work assignment in Tunisia for almost two years, he observed that fellow journalists were completely or almost completely missing even from the open court halls and in public opinion cases, and even about journalists and their union. This is after being narrowed by the justice halls, among them many young people, including computer stand, camera and recording devices. When asked by members of the Press Syndicate Council, they reported that newspapers and other mass media and their different forms of property have become almost completely dependent on “the text that dictates their headquarters and offices or sends them through the What’sapp groups and avoids breaking his words in order to give reasons for safety”. Many facts confirm the ascendancy and control of a previous harsh control system over the press in Egypt over the past few years. This will include disabling the newspaper’s printing until you delete news topics or opinion articles. It also forced electronic press websites to delete its content..
In any case, the most recent count of journalists and media workers held in Egypt by mid -July 2019 includes 32 names , the oldest of which is in August 2013, most of whom are accused of “spreading false news ” as well as “joining a prohibited organization.” This is accompanied by the increased use of renewed preventive detention as a punishment for opponents or suspected opponents. This made the international organizations concerned with freedom of press and safety of journalists place Egypt in the last few years between the second and third ranks among the world countries regarding the imprisonment of journalists. While we are disregarding the restrictive and hazardous work environment, Egypt has not yet known the promulgation of a law to make information available. This notwithstanding the forward-looking general provisions of the 2014 Constitution on press freedom . It is a well known that access to and dissemination of information are foundational for building a democratic society.
In the Libyan case, the work environment in the field, offices and headquarters, and in front of the sources, quickly became a force restricting journalists and the citizen’s right to know. Immediately after Qaddafi’s ouster, the transitional authorities failed to enact and implement legislation to establish a new, free, professional media system. The collapse and absence of the State , divisions, fighting , militias , armed extremist groups and foreign interference have contributed to the formation of a dangerous press environment, whether in eastern or western Libya and other regions. This leads the media to more self-censorship and migration abroad . Only the Tunisian experience achieved a relative improvement in the press work environment and its impact on the citizen’s right to know and compare with what was before the revolution. The review of the latest annual report on the reality of press freedoms in Tunisia and the results of monitoring violations of journalists’ safety issued by the National Union of Tunisian Journalists may prove dangerous and disturbing, but this is not compared to the misery of the press work environment and the denial of the citizen’s right to information in Egypt and Libya. For example, the Tunisian Parliament passed the right to Access Information Act March 22, 2016, before which it was enacted early and in 2011 a decree also was passed “access to administrative documents of public structures”, a development that Egypt and Libya did not witness. However, the author f this paper tested as a press correspondent in Tunisia the chances of this access once and concluded that the reality still violates the texts and are far away from them.
It is clear that Tunisia has taken more important and more paid steps from Egypt and Libya on the road to moving from authoritarian government media to public service media by reforming those state-owned enterprises, particularly on Tunisian national radio and television. A look at the main news bulletin from Channel 1 in both the Egyptian and the Tounsi TV is to reveal the vast difference now. For example, it was not possible – not in channels, broadcasts, state-owned newspapers, and even private newspapers – to criticize or reticent the amendments to the Egyptian Constitution in April 2019. Those that reinforce the authoritarian and individual nature of government, confiscate the chances of circulating of power of the president’s poistion for the longest term and impose more subordination on the judicial authority to the executive political authority. The citizens’ opinion poll on fuel price increases in early July 2019 also came under question limits to justify increases .
In this way, the state-owned media play a negative role in a public opinion . By confiscating citizens’ rights to know and to see multiple opinions through free community dialog , as well as opportunities to express their opinions freely and multilaterally through the media , which they finance from taxes and bear the burden of losses resulting from their lack of professionalism , vitality and independence. On the contrary, there are indications in Tunisia that state -owned audio and visual media are being used to gain the confidence of listeners and viewers, and in a way that surpasses the private ones. Even during the social protest crisis on January 2018. Therefore, interrogators in a poll among a sample of Tunisian journalists considered that the public media is the most neutral and professional. This preference has been reinforced in favor of the audiovisual and audiovisual public media and the early report of the Independent Supreme Electoral Commission of Tunisia on the Constituent Assembly elections October 2011. This important development may be attributed to the early efforts of the National Information and Communication reform Authority , headed by colleague Kamal Al-Obeidi, to expedite the promulgation of Decree 116 on freedom of audio and visual communication , as well as to the efforts of the Subcommittee on Press and Information within the Supreme Authority to achieve the goals of the revolution. It is also attributed mainly to the fact that the will for change in the media scene was first created in Tunisia from civil society and media professionals, it was not a decision issued by the highest hierarchy of the state. However, some media professionals and those who were involved in the restructuring of the state-owned media scene are aware of the dangers of relapse and retreat and that the delay in cutting off the country further steps on the road to democracy , including judicial independence and reform , threatens the independence and professionalism of public media institutions.
he controversy and conflict in Tunisia during 2018 over a new audio- visual media body bill may suggest that the road is still difficult. But the situation is much better than the Egyptian track on state-owned media , which has been based on maintaining a large empire of press releases , broadcasts , and television channels without the will to reform or change until a late legislation was passed in 2018, strengthening the executive and the president’s control over these institutions and bodies Supervising it: The National Media Authority (Radio and Television), the National Press Authority (about 55 publications besides websites) and the Supreme Council for the Organization of Information. The practice also refers to a tendency to impose censorship, and confiscation. The Libyan track seems to have begun to get rid of state-owned media institutions originally set by the interim government on December 7, 2011, with one official television channel, one official radio station and one official press. With the country moves into division and these institutions were distributed among regions, and with the absence of the state, we come to assume that there is no radio, no television or no single newspaper that can work all over Libya , except with rare exceptions. State- owned television and radio seem to have failed to be free and professional and to gain public confidence in comparison with the Tunisian experience and in such a way that they lag behind private channels and broadcasts.
In general, the most prominent progress here in the difficult March of the authoritarian governmental media toward the public or public media came from Tunisia. This is despite the obstacles, and there is an early testimony by UNESCO in the fall of 2012 that, since January 14, 2011, public institutions in the audiovisual sector have improved the diversity of views, the degree of public representation and civil society organizations. However, there is no arrangement for public opinion in the appointment of the members of the Governing Council.” On July 31, the writer of the paper followed up on Tunisia’s national television, broadcasting a debate between three candidates for the post of President and Director -General of the National Television Corporation , organized by the Independent High Commission for Audiovisual Communication. It is an unprecedented event in Tunisia and indeed the entire Arab world, and it remains to be known that the Tunisian government retains the decision to hold positions in the audio -visual media and the state-owned press, which are reserved for itself, and unfrequently violates updated legal provisions on the application of the corresponding opinion (of HAICA) and self-adjusting organizations in the profession.
It seems that the most important development on the level of the emergence of new private mass media came in the radio sector for both Tunisia and Libya, while the authorities in Egypt kept their steel grip and monopolize the radio waves completely. In Tunisia, there are specific opportunities for the development of both linguistic and group radio. It can positively affect the transition to a democratic and decentralized society, especially with public interest and confidence indicators on radio compared with print and television. But all three experiences suffer from a lack of transparency in ownership of private television channels that are mainly for businessmen. A rare report on these channels in Tunisia warns against the dangers of monopolization and the negative influence of “the houses” and foreign capital on the political field and the move to democracy. A German researcher for Egypt between 2011 and 2013 demonstrates the influence of Mubarak’s “accountants” satellite channels in politics and their move from the Brotherhood’s apathy and the first elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi, to incitement to exclusion and overthrow them and the restoration of full authority to the military. Not to mention a combination of satellite ownership and the establishment and financing of political parties. This is before the situation in Egypt reaches the purchase of secret security services for private channels and newspapers and their partnership with businessmen in this field. As in Tunisia , voices have increased inside Egypt warning against the negative effects of the so-called “political money”, the mystery of finance , doubts about Gulf foreign funds and the investment of businessmen with TV channels in party life, and after 25 private satellite channels were established after January 25, 2011. This is accompanied by the awareness that “having media channels is a powerful source of influence, pressure and public opinion. “
It is notable that this is the presence and influence of businessmen in the field of private media and politics together, which is offset by the paradoxes of the scarcity and weakness of party newspapers in the three countries even after the revolution. This is despite the relatively open space and varying degrees of experience in the three experiments for party pluralism and freedom of organization. This paradox is compounded by the perceived death and declining distribution of the print press. They offer higher opportunities for depth, opinion and inquiry treatments. None of the three countries – including Tunisia , which has the best chance of free and professional media – has known the creation of a transparent and reliable institutional mechanism that monitors, censors, and tells readers, listeners, viewers, and listeners, as well as advertisers of newspapers, newspaper purchases, radio, television viewing, and website browsing To develop objective and credible assessments of the opportunities for the media to influence the building of a public opinion on the transition to democracy.
In this context, the Egyptian experiences carry a paradox that suggests the necessity of being cautious about exaggerating the influence of the media – as such – on the general elections and the participation of voters.
Early with Egypt’s first post-revolution election (parliamentary between November 2011 and January 2012), a media researcher noted that the majority of voters moved in the opposite direction to incite talk shows against participation, and concluded “ the Egyptian media’s loss of its role , credibility and influence on public opinion.” The author of this paper can also note , in the light of his follow-up and preview of the first municipal elections in Tunisia after the May 2018 revolution, that privileged media services , especially on national public radio and television , concerning municipalities and their problems , a map of candidate lists and programs , have not significantly affected what has been shown to be the greatest decrease in voting In any general election after the revolution, it was down to 35.6%. Besides the elections, the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences raise question marks about the safety and fairness of public opinion polls, their positions and the possibility of misleading voters. There are some observations and assumptions that we can make here about Sigma Konsay in Tunisia, Al-Ahram Center for political and Strategic Studies and Bassira in Egypt. But, of course , we need a comparative, evaluation and monetary studies to perform these centers and to make them public after 2011.
In the light of the tracking of television satellite channels, radio, newspapers and news websites, hate speech, exclusion and incitement to violence are raised , not to mention excommunication in the name of Islam and excluding in the name of patriotism and the national state. An early report released in Cairo, on the second anniversary of the January Revolution, warned that the media would lose credibility because of the speech and its negative impact on prospects for democratic development. At this early time, it was remarkable – and, indeed, that by 2013, state-owned media had become strongly involved – that private newspapers were at the top of the ranks of these professional abuses. We do not have a comparative study that allows us to estimate the size of hate speech, violence , incitement and defamation between mass media in Tunisia , Libya and Egypt. Although the author presented a paper to a seminar in Morocco in January 2017, she concluded that the practice of defamation by the media in Egypt and Tunisia continued after the revolution together with a certain disparity over the greater chances of correction and response in the second. But the author of this paper, as well as his follow-up , goes on to assume that this speech, with all its components and negative dimensions, has reached an unprecedented and unprecedented extent in the Egyptian case in the last six years .However , there is a need to monitor and analyze what can be called the “Speech of Democratic hatred” in Tunisia as well. This is in light of the growing nostalgia for pre-revolutionary and for a strong authoritarian presidential system. In any event , the dual and contradictory nature and potential of the role of radio and television talk shows must not be overlooked. Sometimes, according to the personality and culture of the broadcaster or activist and the orientation of the means regarding democracy and professionalism, it can play a role in consolidating freedoms and democratic values and in the public’s interactive exercise of these values. This has occurred in many cases with the Egyptian experience in the immediate post -revolutionary period. However, later, it overcame disrespect, incitement, hate speech and censure, especially with the disappearance and emigration of many respected professional media men, and even preventing them from working.
The most important noticeable difference about the Tunisian media situation after the revolution and its supposed effect on the transition to democracy lies in three aspects: The first is the relative vitality of civil society , the opportunities for its support to the freedom and professionalism of the press and thus the contribution to the social struggle for democracy. The second is the opportunities for the emergence and development of new, non -traditional media, especially over the Internet. In Egypt, this is particularly marked by unprecedented tightening and blockade over recent years. The third relates to a degree of political will to reform and change information and to cooperation with civil society, not to mention the international community. In the case of Tunisia, there are evidence in comparison with the Egyptian and Libyan countries that suggest this will. As it is reflected in the fact that , in 2011, Tunisia had known earlier and in 2011 the enactment of legislation for the liberalization of traditional media , as was the case with Decrees 115 and 116, not to mention the Decree on the access to administrative documents of public structures in the same year. This is something Libya never knew, and it was delayed in Egypt until 2018 to issue new legislation in the absence of the spirit and will of reform and change. Even with the desire of the political authority to further tighten control and control over media spaces. Another witness concerns the early and final cancellation of the Ministry of Communication in Tunisia. This is in contrast to the Egyptian situation, where the Ministry of Information returned after its cancellation in February 2011 in July/July of the same year and was appointed as a military editor, and is now replaced by the Supreme Council of the Media Organization.
Issues for discussion and recommendations
Freedom and professionalism in the media contribute to moving societies towards democracy. The elements of the transition to democracy and its consolidation from partisan pluralism, a peaceful transfer of power, institutionalization, good governance, an independent judiciary, freedom of organization, demonstration, protest, legitimacy, the right to oppose rulers and governments, and the growth and strengthening of civil society and its organizations, including trade unions, associations, and free, transparent, and fair elections, all of which constitute the enabling environment for the development of a free and professional media. The traditional media, including newspapers, radios, and televisions, are at the heart of this dialectical relationship. Egypt, Tunisia and Libya paths after the uprisings and revolutions of 2011 reflect media’s sensitivity to developments in the political and societal fluctuations provide stumbling and advancements. In this context and perspective, we assume that winning the battle of liberation and the professionalism of the media is subject to multiple, complicated and protracted conflicts, even in the best of luck, as is the case in Tunisia, especially in the absence of revolutionary decisiveness and estrangement in what happened in our Arab region with what was. As we assume that the traditional media with limited exceptions is not yet playing the large expected influential role in the processes of evolution towards democracy. We can also assume that the use and recruitment of media , both state – owned media or business are employed in blocking the transition to democracy which is a very prominent feature in the three tracks.
It appears that a degree of political will, along with the support and effectiveness of civil society, contributed to a wider margin of freedom for the traditional media in Tunisia after the revolution, compared to Egypt and Libya. Hence, it is possible to assume a greater role in the Tunisian experience to restore and enrich the transition to democracy. This is taking into account several obstacles and obstacles, even for Tunisia. Among them is the societal cultural polarization between “Islamists” and “secularists”, not to mention the effects of the threat of terrorism and the cost of combating it on society, the media, and freedoms, as well as the fragility of working conditions and the operation of media professionals
It seems that the ability of the public to know consciously and make decisions about the values of democracy appears to be evolving outside the traditional local media. The results of a poll conducted for the BBC in 2019, which included samples from the youth of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, confirm the acquisition of social media information, confidence at the expense of traditional media controlled by governments. This paper set that approach on the agenda of media professionals who aspire to freedom and professional and wonder how to rebuild a new media with its traditional and unconventional space. Here, several notes and questions are generated in light of the foregoing in this paper, among them: To what extent can self-criticism and reform be practiced from within the traditional Arab media? What are the opportunities for creating newspapers, radio, and TVs on innovative and serious principles committed to the values of freedom and professionalism, respect for facts, reason and the public, and to pushing forward democratic development, including adopting forms of ownership that include community, regional, and local media owned by cooperative (mutual) forms of journalists themselves
This paper recommends:
– The cooperation of active components of the new civil society in Tunisia after the revolution to launch and sponsor credible and popular media outlets, even if it was necessary to resort to subscription from citizens?
– Issuing periodicals with the launch of an an electronic site to build a new political culture that addresses the dialectic of media and democracy , the experiences and contributions from Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and to allow the exchange of experiences between media professionals, politicians and intellectuals involved in the change.
– Establishing an observatory for media freedom and professionalism that combines following-up and analysis of events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. As the media monitoring standards on general election occasions are not sufficient in terms of their focus on forms of violations and commitment to equal opportunity, fairness and impartiality. we need a wider and more comprehensive and lasting monitoring, and also a contribution to the media or reluctance to spread the values and culture of democracy in our societies.
– A comparative study between the roles and problems of the performance of the Egyptian and Tunisian journalists unions after the revolution, and the author of this paper considers that he is interested in working on this study as soon as possible.
