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Kais Saied’s populism: a communication image or a political approach?

مُتاح أيضًا بـ: العربية (Arabic)

By
Cyrine Guesmi
by
Bilel Cherni
review and edit
Mohamed Omrane

Since July 25th, 2021, Tunisia has been managed by a sole person, President Kais Saied. Increasingly, the man or the Professor as his proponents tend to call him, became at the centre of the debate.
While his particular and controversial personality is sometimes frowned upon, in other times it is subject for resentment.
Is he the saviour? Does he simply distribute “political morphine” pills to soothe the past ten years? Opinions differ, but the core question remains, is Kais Saied really an embodiment of populism?

First of all, and in order to answer the title of the paper, it is necessary to define and measure the populism in which orbit President Kais Saied is accused to revolve in. This depends on our awareness of the basic pillars that build this communicative/ideological pattern, which are:

Minimum populism

taking the people as a reference

Exclusionary populism

minimal populism + exclusion of certain groups

Inclusive populism

exclusionary populism + anti-elite

Jagers and Walgrave described populism in 2006 as a “communicative framework that attracts and identifies people”, yet, we might argue that populism is more than a top-down appeal, centered around an emotional interaction between populist actors and their audiences.

Absolutely, it can be said that populism is a physical manifestation of a dualism that combines reverence for the idea of ​​“the people” on the one hand and the idea of ​​hostility to elites on the other hand combined in the statement that these elites are anti-people and pragmatically opposing them.

Here, it will not be difficult for an examination of the president’s communication process before and after taking office, to admit that he was and still is against the elites, whether political, economic or even intellectual, considering them to be a major cause of the crises afflicting the people, which he embodies, and this is what Kais Said  did and still is doing c(consciously or not) by associating himself with him, marketing and exaggerating him every time he appeared in the media or popular since his appearance on the public debate scene, as an essential element in building the image of the popular man who is hostile to the “rotting” elite, as he puts it, and who causes economic and social crises and political. But, he also appears in the image of a man who has the ability and determination to take matters into his own hands.

Kais Saied (k.S): This is how populist discourse is made!

The populist political discourse is based mainly on 3 axes:

identity construction

Rhetorical style

Relationship with media

Kais Saied paints a picture or an identity

Hall described “identity” as a fragmented and variable construct based on resources from history, language, and culture to represent the ideal ego that reflects difference and exclusion . Hall states that hostility and opposition to the other only crystallize through it and through the game of power and exclusion . Hal’s opinion is in line with Lokalo’s position regarding building a common actor of a popular nature as an act that reflects power through which the populist leader builds the identity of the people. But, it appeals to the majority.

We found that among the unfulfilled demands that accompanied K.S years before he became president of the Republic of Tunisia, is the conclusion of penal conciliation with major businessmen who evade from their obligations. But what is striking how he links the file of evasion of businessmen with development, i.e. regional development and the development of the infrastructure of Tunisia. It is a popular demand since the revolution. In this sence, K.S promises to direct the money that will be paid by businessmen to investment in the regions without stepping into it ever entering the state’s treasury.

In building his image, the populist focuses on the idea of ​​“the people” from which he gets his “legitimacy.” On April 22, 2013, when he was asked about the possibility of achieving penal conciliation, K.S said that he will continue to dream with the people until the dream comes true. He also mentioned that the political system must go in tandem with the will of the people, as he is the sovereign, expressing his rejection of the parliamentary system, or the modified parliamentarian system of governance while asserting his preference for the presidential political system, where the President of the Republic leads the country with the help of a Prime Minister and a government that is responsible to Parliament through the mechanism of the blame list, that if confidence is withdrawn from the government twice, the president is then.

Thus, by gathering, in his speech, a group of unfulfilled demands, which have represented a source of discontent, anger, and sometimes frustration for the majority of the Tunisian people, K.S. created an alternative identity (to the classic politician), a saviour and an imaginative realization of these unfulfilled while lacking the slightest economic program and relying entirely on the statements of the general public and non-specialists, considering it the way out of crises created by the specialists / elite, and ignoring that these demands of an economic nature require planning, a system and a program to achieve them.

The Rhetorical discourse of Kais Saied, his most prominent if not only weapon against his opponents

The style of political discourse used by populists is hostile, emotional, and patriotic. In Kazin 1995’s view, “it is a fixed but amenable style of political discourse” (p. 5), a kind of language that is “constantly renewed to pacify the new elite and warm a new set of public” (p. 287).

Here we found that K.S. uses a language that is hostile against the elite, emotional towards the irrational masses, frustrated and motivated at the same time, and patriotic in terms of trying to transcend the concept of representation in its traditional sense. All this, to emphasize the extreme populist ritual: “The people… all the people are embodied.” It is a fixed text in terms of style, but subject to change in terms of political interaction with the current, as seen by Kazin, and as practiced by K.S. Sometimes, it targets conservative groups of society, and other times it targets a progressive, non-conservative segment. For example, in a lecture he gave in November 2014, K.S. stated that the current constitution and even the 1959 constitution does not contradict the Islamic Sharia. However, in a lecture he gave in December 2012, he affirmed that  the issue whether the state’s religion is Islam or not relates directly to determining the source of legislation, and that the application of Islamic Sharia has already been upheld by the jurisprudence, and that there is no need to change the first Article of the constitution. In the same context, in another speech after his election as President of the Republic, during the ceremony dedicated to the celebration of Tunisian Women’s Day on August 13,2020 K.S. said that the state has no religion. He made a point by asking whether there’s also a doomsday for the state too. Additionally, he asked “Will some of the member states of the United Nations go to heaven while the rest go to hell?”. He explained that religion is for nations and not for states, since the state is a moral concept that does not exceed a mere legal conception, unlike nations that are comprised of persons who can profess a religion. Therefore, whenever Saied targets a particular set of public, he warms it up as explained by Kazin. As a result of his discourse, the targeted category joins and is added to his mass of supporters.

Qais Saeed's statement on August 13, 2020

Qais Saeed's lecture in December 2012

In most of his statements classified as “populist”, K.S. has clearly and explicitly aligned himself with the use of an idiomatic field that opposes largely the elite discourse on many levels.

Politically, K.S’s speech lacks important terms that have been used excessively by the governing elite during the last 10  years of governance. These terms include “democratic transition, negotiations, ideology .. etc”. Instead he replaced them with other terms such as “the people, accountability, revolution, youth..”. Meanwhile he did not address any particular social class, intellectual reference , a specific region. All that is qualified as an attempt to transcend the concept of representation in its traditional sense and seek to create a “the personification of the people” i.e. “le peuple incarné” or “the embodiment of the people”. In the same vein,  during his speech on the occasion of the New Administrative Year 2020 we hear him saying: “Our great people started a new stage in history, and no one has the right to disappoint the people’s hopes and aspirations,” referring to the process of his election as president of Tunisia, a well-known and ancient technique that found the populist discourse in which the “populist” stands in contrast to the “elite” while highlighting his direct connection to the “people”, and thus his communication technique is a means to construct his identity.

Economically, Saied’s conversations exclude economic terms which are essential in any process of analysis, construction, or even demolition of a particular economic system. As if, by rejecting the elitist/scientific/classical economic lexicon, he paints the image of the man who is against the upper economic class that is engraved in the popular imagination of the general public. Indeed, his economic-oriented statements miss the words development, investment, inflation, growth rate, trade balance, etc..). Instead, he strongly urges for using terms like monopoly, corruption, poverty, high prices, the blood of the people…). All of this, without having an actual alternative program, or a project that is away from the discourses directed at public consumption.

On these two levels, K.S significantly attempts to create a communicative framework that “attracts people”, as Walgrave puts it, and constantly tries to warm them up,

The major populist experiences in the world rely upon specific concepts of identity. So, we see the ethnic/national concept in the populism of the Nazis, and the class discourse in the populist Soviet camp. Recently, the populist discourse has been widely based on nationalism such as the speeches of Donald Trump, the ex-American President.

As for K.S., he concentrates in his speeches on moral concepts (the popular moral system) in all matters. Therefore, it is correct and fair to say that he qualifies as an ethical populist. This categorization explains his dependency to the moral values he transmits during his speeches reflecting an imminent picture of the preacher who gives lessons to his listeners.

 In 2014, during a television interview, K.S criticized the absence of Justice in the political and judicial system, saying: “Where are Al-Khornaq and Al-Sudair, where are the palaces of Aad?” Al-Khornaq and Al-Sudair are two palaces located in the region of Iraq, and their exact location is not known today. The Al-Kornaq palace was initially built by a foreign engineer called Sanmar. After the latter had finished building the palace, he told his friend that it contains a brick that is if removed the whole palace would fall. 

It seems fait at this point to wonder, could Sanmar be Kais Saied? Could the constitution be the practical embodiment of Al Khornaq’s palace? Could Article 80 of the 2014 constitution be the brick that brought down the constitution?

In the same dialogue, k.S. talks about the absence of justice, so he cites a verse of Al-Moutanabi’s  poem that says

“ Oh you the most just of people except in my dealings, in you is the quarrel and you are the opponent and the judge.”

During his election campaign in 2019, he conducted an interview with journalist Thamer Makki, and went to the justice and justice system again to adopt Ibn Miskawayh’s theory of justice after he cited his book “A Message on the Nature of Justice.”

According to Abu Ali Ibn al-Miskawiah , justice is the central nerve to his moral philosophy.

k.S. also insists on maintaining his image as a constitutional expert more that his image as president of the republic. He keeps looking for more ways to enhance this image. Perhaps, this is the goal behind his gathering of a group of constitutional law experts, as he invited Dean Sadek Belaid, Dean Mohamed Saleh Ben Issa, and Professor Amin Mahfoudh, who are scientific figures whose academic values cannot be contested.

The President of the Republic began his dialogue with these experts by saying his: “desire to meet them does not concern a legal discussion, but rather a political issue regarding the qualification of the July 25th, 2021 as a coup and the failure of some persons to recognize that the imminent danger enshrined in Article 80 is not only real and imminent, but is pervasive and is real”

The president and the media: a one-way relationship.

Like all political actors, populists use, interact with and cover the media. Besides, populists use multiple channels of political communication to convey their messages and communicate with their audiences in contemporary societies. Their messages are passed through all politics depending on the level. It is imperative that populists use the media to “express and represent politics” (Waisbord, 2003, p. 201).
Mazzolini (2003, 2008) and collavald (2015) have suggested that, rather than blocking their progress, increasingly pessimistic and anti-political media, even when they attempt to criticize, they help “formalize populism”. Thus contributing to the legitimation of populism by winning Public support against parties competing parties for power.

We can say that populism and populist figures tend to feed off media controversy. Indeed, their tactics may include (a) playing “the underdog,” (b) using “abrasive speech,” (c) earning media spaces by a “bullying” style against the establishment, and (d) staging “newsworthy” political events (Mazzoleni, 2008) . However, this process cannot be viewed just from the perspective of linear media “effects,” because increasingly mediatized Western individuals and groups are continuously interacting in public conversations via social media (Chadwick, 2013)
Whereas, we found that the professional and academic opinion in the media and press sector is in its entirety necessitates development and overcoming the weaknesses that are diagnosed in all corners of the sector, whether public or private, audio or visual or otherwise. For example, the expert in media and communication strategies and former communication advisor to Prime Minister Ridha Kazdaghli says: “The media sector in Tunisia has not yet recovered from the positive shock that occurred to it after the revolution”, and added that “this shock did not give journalists an opportunity to highlight their skills and impose professional journalism due to the presence of parties controlling money and investment in media institutions who were able to play this role and impose agendas and directives on them”. The director of the Tunis Center for Freedom of the Press, Mahmoud Dhawadi, confirmed the existence of breaches and abuses at the level of media that contradict with professional values such as Serious, ethical and professional journalism.
Academics and professionals talked about the breaches and ways to advance a sector that is considered the most important and most dangerous tool for influencing public opinion in a country that living for the last ten years on the precursors of an incomplete democratic transition.

On the other hand, the citizen takes a more radical position than the local media. Between opponents, critics and cynics, most positions center around negative to very negative evaluation of the political programs. In particular, some consider that the money and politics barons control the entire media message, while others assert that the Tunisian media is the same as before the 2011 revolution. Analyses and opinions that prompted the citizen to turn to social networking sites as a news source and an analytical space vary.
In this context, Kais Saied’s relationship with the media comes. It is not possible to undertake the president’s communication policy with the press and the media without undertaking at the same time the opinion of “the people” in it. This is of course due to the fact that the president’s communication process is largely based on the image of “the people want “The president wants,” and this is the image that the K.S. is working to create, polish, nourish and consolidate, in addition to the fact that the relationship between the people and its leader and inspirer, and its embodiment in the populist logic, cannot pass through media, tools, or institutions, including the Press.
It should be noted here that the image of the populist figure that stands at the other end of things and contradicts the political and economic upper classes, and of course the media elite too, was not an image that K.S. worked on recently. Since his election campaign he abandoned all forms of academic and classic political communication such as giant advertising banners, social networking sites , refusal of public funding etc. He presented himself as a man without a party, an electoral machine, or political or economic lobbies away from the constrains of the previous 10 years. As such, he is free and connects directly, without intermediaries, with the people.

It explains as well the strategy of the Presidency of the Republic, especially in the recent period after K.S. assumed the position of President of the Republic, economizing in communication. Indeed, it is as if K.S. refuses to communicate with the people through means of communication and media “that the people hate.” So he contents himself with using the only channel he completely controls, which is the presidency’s Facebook page.
Also in the context of his relationship with the media, the protests and criticism directed against the Presidency in its communication policy have multiplied in the recent period. We see many journalists who want the channels of communication with the Presidency to be more accessible. In addition, criticisms of the Audio-visual Communication Authority (HAICA) for obstructing the right of communication with the Presidency of the Republic have also increased as Journalists need to have access to information to cover presidential activities which is why the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists condemns the “blackout policy” undertaken by the Presidency of the Republic. These shortcomings may be an expression of apprehension about communication and mediators, a prominent feature of Kais Saied during his electoral campaign. This apprehension is in itself an expression of the will of the new President of the Republic to control his image and could also be stemming from his direct hostility towards it if not an attempt to delegitimize and claim that journalists are allied with the political elites. All this serves the account of the new means of communication that served the populists and promoted their ideas in the American and European experiences, according to what the writer Yasha Monk reported in “The People Against Democracy.”

What does the man want?!

Since 2011, Kais Saied has proposed a different institutional structure, one that is in contradiction with what has been achieved and proposed since the outbreak of the revolution, which can be considered in theory as part of the eternal conflict between the two ideas of liberal representative democracy and the idea of direct democracy.
He did not put forward a clear electoral program, and his electoral campaign was also not in the traditional and familiar form. During his election campaign, K.S repeated a project he had presented in 2011 under the title for a new establishment, that is, a new political thought translated by a new constitutional text. During his electoral campaign, he publicly suggested that he will opt for amending the constitution, to ensure that the construction starts from the local to the center, through the establishment of local councils in each delegation, provided that candidacy is accepted by acclamation and equal participation. In his perception of the regime, there will be representation for people with disabilities, and local councils also should include directors of administrations acting as local observers, they do not have the right to vote, and the security supervisors in the delegation are considered to be appointed by election. The choice is made by lottery on who will represent the local council at the regional level, provided that the period is specified so that all members can be represented and supervised. In other words, all projects and proposals should derive from the popular roots. Parliamentary elections are also cancelled and escalation is carried out from local councils to regional ones, and then to Parliament. K.S is not keen on parties but in his program he will not abolish their existence but he will certainly restrict its activities through laws and media to finally be pluralistic but devoid of substance. In addition to a weak opposition that doesn’t convince and as a result won’t have influence.
His position from association and human rights isn’t any better. The man sees, since his beginnings, homosexuality as an anomaly, he is pro the death penalty, against equality in inheritance, has a project to stop the support of NGOs either from the inside or the outside, he is simply waiting for the right moment to do it.

This perception doesn’t contradict with the idea of freezing the parliament and abolishing some of the constitutional authorities. It also reflects the “populist’s” attempt to affect institutions that could represent some kind of opposition. It is why the populist tends to empty constitutions from their meaning and representative democracy ideas that are based upon institutions.

What the K.S. really fears is that he will lose his legitimacy before the international community while attempting to delegitimize the ruling elite, especially since the international community does not care about his rhetorical style, nor his theoretical upholding of popular legitimacy, nor his relationship with the media.

Does Kais Saied protect the rights and freedoms?

In this part, we will monitor rights and freedoms in the period after July 25, 2021, since it is the stage that reveals the extent of K.S commitment to protecting and respecting rights and freedoms as he claims, and affirms in every speech.

On the evening of Sunday, July 25, 2021, K.S. announced the activation of Article 80 of the Constitution, and thus took a number of decisions stipulating:

The activation of Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution does not provide for the freezing of parliament, the lifting of the immunity of its members, or the resignation (dismissal) of the prime minister, but K.S. insisted that he takes these decisions within the framework of the 2014 constitution.

At the same time, he always declares that the constitution he breached in order to serve his personal vision and interpretations, which he violated many times as we will explain later, keeps hurdling him from moving forward with his project of restructuring the state institutions according to his personal perception. Of course, he considers his vision to be an expression of demands that detain its legitimacy from the people directly and under the slogan  of the ” People want”.

In all the meetings he held since the night of July 25, the man affirmed his full respect for the constitution, rights and freedoms, and emphasized that these decisions did not include and did not affect rights and freedoms. The matter remained so until the evening of September 22, 2021, in which he announced the continuation of implementation of the constitution, but through the Preamble and Chapters I and II only, with the abolition of the temporary body to monitor the constitutionality of laws. In the Official Gazette, Presidential Decree No. 117 dated September 22, 2021 was issued regarding a set of exceptional measures, which shall be considered a mini-constitution. We have tried to follow up on all the measures that have been taken during this period. Here are the main points of discussion:

The truth is that K.S. dealt and interacted with these violations using his own communicative method, “attracting people,” according to Walgrave’s expression, and he constantly tries to warm them up, as we have already explained. He held a number of meetings related to rights and freedoms, and political, partisan and association work, both at the internal and external levels in an attempt from him to reassure (warm) those groups concerned about his policies towards this file. Saied also tried to work on exploiting the vaccination file against Corona as a political campaign that shows and proves the people’s support for him and for all the measures taken, so he delivered a speech to Tunisian men and women to urge them to show up for vaccination, and he published it as usual, through the official page of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia. In this context, vaccination operations against the Coronavirus witnessed a remarkable rise in the pattern by organizing open days for vaccination, so that the outcome would increase the number of male and female citizens who completed their vaccination, which now exceeds three million. It is worth noting that the vaccination rate in the last national weeks and days decreased by a large rate compared to the beginning of the work in this way.

 On the day immediately following the activation of Article 80 and the announcement of exceptional measures, K.S. received Mr. Noureddine Taboubi, Secretary-General of the Tunisian General Labour Union, President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, President of the National Lawyers Association, and President of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing.

 During the meeting, he stressed his keenness to respect the constitution and its requirements, impose the law on everyone and ensure the independence of the judiciary. On the same day  he met with Mr. Jamel Msallem, President of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights,  its General Secretary, Mr. Mohamed Yassin Jelassi, President of the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, and Mr. Abderrahmane Hedhili, President of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. On this meeting, he reiterated his firm commitment to guaranteeing rights and freedoms, respecting the rule of law and the democratic path.

Mr. Noureddine Taboubi, Secretary General of the Tunisian General Labor Union

 On the day immediately following the activation of Article 80 and the announcement of exceptional measures, K.S. received Mr. Noureddine Taboubi, Secretary-General of the Tunisian General Labour Union, President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, President of the National Lawyers Association, and President of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing.

 During the meeting, he stressed his keenness to respect the constitution and its requirements, impose the law on everyone and ensure the independence of the judiciary. On the same day  he met with Mr. Jamel Msallem, President of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights,  its General Secretary, Mr. Mohamed Yassin Jelassi, President of the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, and Mr. Abderrahmane Hedhili, President of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. On this meeting, he reiterated his firm commitment to guaranteeing rights and freedoms, respecting the rule of law and the democratic path.

In the days following the announcement of these exceptional measures, and in the midst of the disagreement over the definition of what happened in Tunisia, Tunisian society was divided between a supporting side describing and defining what happened as a “course correction”, and another side rejecting what happened and describing it and directly knowing it as a “coup”. Meanwhile, the New York Times published an article for its correspondent in Tunisia, tending to describe what happened on July 25 as a constitutional coup. Two days later, K.S, on the 30th of July, received the journalists of the NY times. On that occasion, he spoke about the US Constitution and emphasized his specialization as a professor of constitutional law, stressing that everything that happened in Tunisia falls naturally within the framework of the constitution and the full preservation of rights and freedoms.

After the emergence of many violations during the month of August, K.S. received on September 2, 2021, Mr. Ibrahim Bouderbala, Dean of the National bar association of lawyers, General Secretary of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights, and Mr. Bassam Tarifi and Vice President of the Association.

 During that interview, he emphasized the There is no way to go back, reiterating that he is steadfast in his strong commitment to continue in the same approach and not to prejudice human rights and respect for freedoms, including freedom of expression and demonstration, and rejection of bargaining, blackmail, injustice and any violation of the law. The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists was unable to meet the invitation to attend this meeting due to union affiliations within the territory of the Republic. It is worth noting that this meeting came the day after the security forces attacked journalists while covering the protest movement of the we are not Muslims movement.

On the external level, K.S. received on September 4, a delegation from the US Senate that included Senator Chris Murphy and Senator Jon Ossoff. The Head of State stressed that the exceptional measures taken on July 25, 2021 fall within the framework of full respect for the Constitution, unlike the false allegations and false slanders being promoted, stressing that they reflect a broad popular will and aim to protect the Tunisian state from all attempts to tamper with it.

On the day following the first protest against him and his exceptional measures in the heart of the capital, under the title “Against the coup”, specifically on September 14, the President of the Republic received at Carthage Palace, Dean Sadek Belaid, Dean Mohamed Saleh ben Issa and Professor Amin Mahfoudh. The meeting touched on the political situation in Tunisia and several constitutional issues, and indicated that it is important to form a government, but also it is equally necessary to draw a perception of the policy that shall be undertaken by the government to serve the Tunisian people. He also stressed that he does not support chaos and coups and reiterated his obligation to respect liberties, rights and freedoms. He affirmed also his steadiness in continuing with the clear path drawn by the wide popular will.

After the increasing number of complaints about the travel ban and harassment at Carthage International Airport for Tunisian citizens, the official page of the Presidency of the Republic issued on September 17 a statement that K.S. had instructed the person in charge of running the Ministry of the Interior, that no one would be prevented from traveling unless he was the subject of a judicial warrant. It added that banning persons from travelling shall be done in full respect of the law, the preservation of the dignity, and the observance of the obligations of travellers abroad.

Kais Saied continues to reassure (warm up) all parties internally, trying to cover up or react to the multiple violations, which sometimes tend to be systematic.

As for the democratic transition, it can be said that we are living in its most dangerous stage, as the possibility of returning to the era of dictatorship is present more than ever since all state institutions have become dysfunctional and the President of the Republic has combined all powers in his hand. As a result, the danger today has become clear and even stifled by imposing a fait accompli. For more than 60 days, we have been waiting for the roadmap to be announced. The economic and social situation today is critical and ready to explode at any moment. Every delay will lead to dire consequences. Thus, it can be concluded that the democratic transition in Tunisia is under threat today.

Since K.S.’s notable success in the presidential elections in comparison to his direct competitor, Nabil Karoui, he has been using the constitution by exploiting his powers as stipulated in the 2014 constitution. He does test his constitutional limits by challenging the Parliament in the process of rejecting or giving confidence to the government and its head. Using these loopholes in his favour for the purposes of creating a loyal government such as that of Fakhfekh. His attempts to control the government work includes also appointing a prime minister who is obedient, from within the wheels of the state and without the required experience. This prime minister would ideally need his help, support and guidance, or so he thought in his imagination. It is why he chose so he Mechichi, but he failed in these two attempts. Imposing his conception of complete obedience to the executive and security apparatus is considered to be the causa behind the activation of Article 80 of the Constitution.

Based on all of the above, it can be said that the President of the Republic has not fulfilled his promise to respect the Constitution, and that these violations threaten and even strike heavily human rights, freedoms, and the democratic transition in Tunisia.

مُتاح أيضًا بـ: العربية (Arabic)

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